

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Vienna 12

53

Action
EUR

Control: 16375
Rec'd: MAY 25, 1961
4:49 P.M.

Info FROM: BERL IN

SS TO: Secretary of State
G
SP NO: 572, MAY 25, 7 P.M.
L
H

SB PRIORITY

D

SAE SENT BONN 525, DEPARTMENT 572, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 272,
PX LONDON 241, MOSCOW 255

IOP

INR PARIS FOR EMBASSY, USRO, STOESSEL, CINCEUR FOR FINN

RRM

ON ASSUMPTION BERL IN WILL BE AMONG MAJOR ISSUES DISCUSSED
VIENNA, I SHOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE SEVERAL ASPECTS BERL IN
PROBLEM THAT APPEAR IMPORTANT FROM VANTAGE POINT OF BERL IN
ITSELF.

BASIC SOV AIM TOWARD BERL IN UNCHANGED THOUGH TACTICS APPARENTLY
HAVE BECOME MORE REASONABLE AS RESULT OF WESTERN RESISTANCE.
WEST BERL IN HAS REMAINED FREE BECAUSE SOVS HAVE REALIZED THAT
PRECIPITATE ACTION TO ABSORB IT INTO GDR WOULD ENTAIL GRAVE
RISK OF WAR.

PLAYING ON WEST'S STRONG DESIRE AVOID WAR, SOVS TRYING PUSH
US INTO MAKING NEW ARRANGEMENTS THAT WILL APPEAR REASONABLE
BUT ACTUALLY WILL START EROSION PROCESS ENDING IN BERL IN'S
ABSORPTION INTO GDR.

SOVS AND GDR IN MAJOR PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN SINCE ABORTIVE
SUMMIT HAVE BEEN TRYING SOFTEN UP WEST BY CONVINCING US
(1) KHRUSHCHEV REALLY MEANS HE CANNOT WAIT ANY LONGER AND
INTENDS SOON TO FORCE ISSUE THROUGH CONCLUSION SEPARATE PEACE
TREATY; (2) SOVS CERTAIN WEST WILL NOT FIGHT FOR BERL IN;
(3) WE SHOULD THEREFORE AGREE ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS (A LA
/GENEVA 1959)

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652 Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
State Dept NLR-26-284
By MDP NARS Date 5-11-76

-2- 572, MAY 25, 7 P.M. FROM BERL IN

GENEVA 1959) OR FACE CONSEQUENCES.

ALTHOUGH CONTINUING FLOW OF REFUGEES MAY CONSTITUTE SERIOUS LONG RANGE SOCIAL-ECONOMIC PROBLEM FOR GDR AND IS CERTAINLY AN ACUTE IRRITANT, PRESSURES ON KHRUSHCHEV FROM GDR TO SOLVE BERL IN SITUATION ARE PROBABLY NO GREATER TODAY THAN IN RECENT PAST. CERTAIN COMPULSION FOR A BERL IN "SOLUTION" EXISTS AS A RESULT OF KHRUSHCHEV'S OWN ARTIFICIALLY STIMULATED PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN, WHICH CREATES A FACE-SAVING PROBLEM. HOWEVER, FREQUENTLY MENTIONED PRESSURE TO REPORT PROGRESS ON BERL IN TO CPSU CONGRESS IN OCTOBER SHOULD HAVE DECLINED IN LIGHT SOV SPACE SUCCESS AND ADVANCE OF COMMUNISM IN LAOS AND CUBA. IN SHORT SOVS COULD LIVE WITH BERL IN STATUS QUO FOR SOME TIME.

I DOUBT IF KHRUSHCHEV HAS FIRM POLICY DECISION OR TIMETABLE ON BERL IN AT THIS MOMENT; FACT NO REAL BERL IN SHOWDOWN DURING PAST TWO AND ONE/HALF YEARS INDICATES INTER ALIA SOVS NOT SURE UNPREDICTABLE WEST WILL NOT FIGHT FOR BERL IN. IN THIS SITUATION WITH BOTH SIDES HEAVILY COMMITTED TO RETAIN POSITIONS AND NEITHER ANXIOUS TO FORCE MATTERS TO SHOWDOWN THAT COULD PRECIPITATE WAR, VIENNA MEETING PROVIDES OPPORTUNITY, PERHAPS ONE OF LAST OPPORTUNITIES, TO CONVINCE KHRUSHCHEV OF U.S. DETERMINATION MAKE GOOD ON BERL IN PLEDGES REGARDLESS OF CONSEQUENCES.

FACT THAT KHRUSHCHEV WILL ATTEMPT CONVINCE PRESIDENT OF HIS OWN DETERMINATION SOLVE BERL IN ALONG FAMILIAR SOVIET-GDR LINES ONLY SERVES TO EMPHASIZE IMPORTANCE THIS PSYCHOLOGICAL DUEL AT VIENNA. I BELIEVE SOVIET TOUGHNESS RE THEIR BERL IN INTENTIONS REFLECTS SERIOUS DESIRE CHANGE BERL IN STATUS, BUT ALSO INCLUDES LARGE ELEMENT OF BLUFF. I DOUBT SOV RESOLVE IS SUFFICIENT TO RISK THERMO-NUCLEAR WAR. THEREFORE, AT THIS STAGE, U.S. MUST BE EVEN TOUGHER IF KHRUSHCHEV IS TO GO AWAY FROM VIENNA CONVINCED HIS THREATS ARE TOO RISKY TO WARRANT CARRYING THEM OUT.

/ I REALIZE

-3- 572, MAY 25, 7 P.M. FROM BERLIN

I REALIZE PRESIDENT IN FIRST MEETING WITH KHRUSHCHEV WILL NOT WISH APPEAR UNREASONABLE; HOWEVER, ANY INDICATION PRESIDENT WILLING DISCUSS "INTERIM SOLUTIONS," COMPROMISES, OR MODUS VIVENDI IF SOVS SIGN SEPARATE PEACE TREATY, WOULD REDUCE IMPACT OF WARNING KHRUSHCHEV OF DIRE CONSEQUENCES HIS MISCALCULATING OUR RESOLVE.

FACT THAT IN THIS MEETING THINGS CAN BE SAID WHICH CANNOT BE SPELLED OUT IN QUADRIPARTITE CONFERENCE MAY GIVE PRESIDENT OPPORTUNITY TELL KHRUSHCHEV IN BLUNT LANGUAGE THAT WE CONSIDER USSR SOLELY TO BLAME FOR DIVISION OF GERMANY AND DENIAL RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION TO GERMAN PEOPLE; SOVS SHOULD KEEP HANDS OFF BERLIN WHERE U.S. COMMITTED TO STAY; THERE REALLY NOTHING FURTHER TO DISCUSS ON BERLIN ITSELF.

IN SUM, VIENNA WILL BE PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING GROUND AND U.S. POSITION ON BERLIN IN MY VIEW SHOULD BE MOLDED CAREFULLY TO CREATE STRONGEST POSSIBLE IMPRESSION ON KHRUSHCHEV OF U.S. FIRMNESS OF INTENTION ON BERLIN IN EFFORT TO DETER HIM FURTHER FROM COURSE OF ACTION HE HAS BEEN THREATENING SINCE NOV 1958.

LIGHTNER

JH